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Abstract:    The  ‘in  betweenity’  of  islands  is  an  ongoing  problematic  in  contemporary 
politics. Given their  geographic definition and  boundedness, islands tend to be unitary 
jurisdictions   that means that they are unlikely to be shared by more than one power. In 
fact, there are just 11 islands in the world whose territory is ‘shared’ between more than 
one  national  jurisdiction.  Meanwhile,  there  are  still  various  small  islands  and  other 
bounded  territories  whose  status  is  contested  amongst  different  (usually  larger)  states, 
including Kinmen (Taiwan), Falklands/Malvinas and Gibraltar. In this context, this essay 
reviews the River Plate area  (between  Uruguay and  Argentina): historically  a point of 
tension between two major powers in Latin America; and some of that tension has been 
centered on the islands in the region – particularly Martín García. 
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Introduction 
"Les  Îles  de  la  Manche  sont  des  morceaux  de  France  tombés  dans  la  mer  et 
ramassés  par  l'Angleterre.  De  la  une  nationalité  complexe,  les  Jerriais  et 
Guernesiais ne sont certainement pas anglais sans le vouloir, mais ils sont français 
sans le savoir" (Victor Hugo – quoted in Jersey Links, 2006). 
Victor  Hugo,  the  acclaimed  French  novelist,  lived  in  Jersey  (1852 1855)  and  then  in 
Guernsey,  until  1870.  His  succinct  observation  sums  up  not  just  the  character  of  the 
Channel Islanders, (located betwixt England and France) but that of many island societies 
the  world  over,  especially  those  that  find  themselves  ‘in  between’.  Islanders  may  see 
themselves  as  essentially  of  one  national  sentiment,  but  external  (continental based) 
observers may beg to differ. Irrespective of what the local islanders might say or think, is 
the island of Martín García Uruguayan? Is Mayotte French? Is Aruba Dutch? Is Puerto 
Rico American? Are the Falklands/Malvinas Argentine? And, where physical geography 
confronts  cultural  identity,  which  of  the  two  should  overrule  the  other?  Are  the  local 
islanders actually settlers, or worse, squatters, whose views and preferences are irrelevant 
and  inconsequential  in  deciding  the  issue  of  legitimate  ownership  between  rival 
neighbouring states? Should the islanders in question be ‘decolonized’ for the sake of their 
interests, rather than remain status quo for the sake of their wishes? How can the islands of G. Baldacchino 
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the  Río  de  la  Plata,  and  the  condition  of  islandness  generally,  inform  us  about  such 
questions? 
 
This  paper  is  a  ‘broad brush’,  sweepingly  general  attempt  at  analyzing  international 
relations  involving  contested  islands  by  deploying  this  concept  of  ‘in  betweenity’;  a 
concept that extends well beyond the location of many islands between larger territories, 
and  at  the  intersection  of  their  associated  histories,  cultures  and  languages
1.  More 
specifically, it focuses on the ‘exclave’ of Martín García in the Río Plata – a small island 
by any measure, but hopefully rich in its implications for the study at hand
2. To do so, the 
experience  of  various  islands  ‘in  between’  are  reviewed,  identifying  such  comparable 
bones  of  contention  as  the  strategic  implications  of  exclusive  economic  zones,  shared 
sovereignty  and  territorial  indivisibility.  Judging  from  such  cases  as  Martín  García,  it 
appears that such creative approaches to island governance that include demilitarization 
and/or depopulation, may be the most likely to mitigate, if not resolve, some currently 
disputed island regions. 
 
Continental Islands, Oceanic Islands: Flashpoint Cases  
 
Island bio geographers (e.g. Nunn, 1994; Quammen, 1996) tell us that most of the islands 
of the world can be grouped under two main categories: first, there are the continental 
islands, which usually lie just off a mainland and occupy parts of the same continental 
shelf. They would have been formed by rising ocean waters which covered coastal areas or 
cut off peninsulas, leaving only the summits of coastal highlands above water. They are 
old, lie in relatively shallow water, and would have started with the same species range as 
the contiguous mainland, and would progressively lose biota with time. Second are the 
oceanic islands, usually in the middle of large swathes of deep ocean, which often result 
from magma upwelling at the boundary between divergent tectonic plates. Other oceanic 
islands are formed as oceanic plates move over fixed ‘hot spots’ (plumes of magma or lava 
welling up from the earth’s crust). Oceanic islands are younger than continental islands, 
and start with no (human or non human) living things, which they then gain progressively 
with time.  Many are affected by coral growing activity. 
 
It is the very same geo physical conditions that place islands as objects of a keen territorial 
game in contemporary politics.  
 
First,  if  continental  islands  occupy  parts  of  the  same  continental  shelf  as  contiguous 
mainlands, then such mainland states would expect to exercise control over such islands, 
quoting geophysical affinity as the main basis of their claim, based on the UN Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (UN, 1958). Difficulties however arise if 
and when (1) more than one mainland country exercises a legitimate claim to its “territorial 
sea”; and (2) should a contested island be inhabited, there may be a preferred identification 
                                                 
1 ‘The Islands in Between’ is the title of an annual conference exploring the folklore, language, literature and 
history of the Eastern Caribbean. http://cavehill.uwi.edu/fhe/Hum/Conferences/IslandsInBetween.htm. 
2 Can one utilize the concept of an exclave in the case of an island that lies inside the territorial waters (but 
not the territory) of another country? According to Muir (1975: 43), an exclave is a piece of land that is: (a) 
part of a country from which it is physically isolated; and (b) is totally surrounded by foreign territory.                                                                                                          Islands in Between 
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of the islanders with either a particular mainland state – even if located much further away 
– or for wholesale self determination.  
 
Second, while oceanic islands are not on continental shelves, and therefore not obvious 
appendages  to  mainland  states,  their  location  in  remote  locations,  and  (except  in  the 
Pacific) often without indigenous populations, has made them tempting prizes to countries 
with imperial aspirations. All the more so if their control endows the continental power not 
just with a strategic location but also with very large portions of ocean as a component of 
that  power’s  exclusive  economic  zone.  In  international  maritime  law,  an  exclusive 
economic  zone  (EEZ)  is  a  sea zone  over  which  a  state  has  special  rights  over  the 
exploration and use of marine resources. Generally, a state’s EEZ extends to 200 nautical 
miles  (370  km)  out  from  its  coasts,  except  where  resulting  points  would  be  closer  to 
similar claims of another country. Thus, France is the country with the world’s second 
largest  EEZ  (after  the  USA),  thanks  primarily  to  its  far flung  départements  and 
collectivités d’outre mer, all of which, except one (French Guiana), are islands. Such a 
visioning may also dramatically change our understanding of an island’s size, its location 
and its relative proximity to other territories (and their own EEZs). 
Islands of Tension 
Thus, both continental and oceanic islands can be flash points in a geo political sense, and 
can  be  a  source  of  international  and  regional  tension  or  conflict  (Anderson,  2000).  A 
flashpoint  is  defined  here  as  a  "current,  dormant,  or  potential"  area  of  geopolitical 
instability. There are, for example, at least nine commonly agreed flash points of current 
geo political tension in East and South East Asia, of which all but one (North Korea) are 
islands.  These  are:  (1)  the  Kuriles  –  occupied  by  Russia,  claimed  by  Japan;  (2)  the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku  islands  –  rival  claims  by  China,  Taiwan  and  Japan;  (3)  Taiwan  – 
recognized as a sovereign state by 25 countries; but considered a renegade province by 
mainland China since 1949; (4) the Spratly and Paracel Islands – variously claimed by 
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei; (5) Mindanao – in spite of 
a treaty, Muslim rebels are still fighting for independence from the Philippines; (6) East 
Timor – former Portuguese colony annexed by Indonesia in 1975, independent since 2002, 
but intermittently riddled by internal strife; (7) the Moluccas (Spice Islands) of Indonesia – 
scene of violent clashes since 1999; and (8) Dok-do / Takeshima – rival claims by South 
Korea and Japan (Norton Moore & Nordquist, 1998; BBC, 2004; Bong, 2002; Mack, 1997; 
Zakharchenko, 2008). 
Åland / Ahvenanmaa 
It was a flashpoint in the Baltic that led to the crafting of the autonomy of the Åland 
archipelago, a sprawling group of islands between Stockholm and Turku, Finland. The 
islands were claimed by newly independent Finland; but with its island population zealous 
to maintain its Swedish culture and language, the League of Nations issued a landmark 
decision in 1920 which guaranteed the demilitarization of the islands, assigned them to 
Finland, but obliged the latter to respect the Ålanders’ autonomy. Åland (in Swedish) or 
Ahvenanmaa (in Finnish), with their population of 27,000, have their own parliament and G. Baldacchino 
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executive; they benefited from a separate protocol to the treaty of accession when Finland 
joined the European Union in 1995; and they run a successful cruise ship industry that 
exploits their geographic and political in betweenity as a duty free zone (e.g. Lindström, 
2000). 
Hans Island / Hans Ø 
The Arctic as a region could become much more important if climate change and global 
warming makes it accessible to more human activity; there are concerns by at least five 
directly  interested  coastal  sovereign  states  as  to  how  they  might  stake  and  settle  their 
Arctic claims via the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). One 
particular dispute involving a small island may well turn into a test case on sovereignty 
claims in the region.  
Hans  Island  (in  English),  Tartupaluk  (in  Inuktitut)  or  Hans  Ø  (in  Danish)  is  a  small, 
uninhabited, barren knoll measuring just 1.3 km² (0.5 square miles), located in the centre 
of the strait that separates Canada’s Ellesmere Island from northern Greenland. In 1933, 
the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  declared  the  legal  status  of  Greenland  in 
favour of Denmark; but the status of Hans Island was then not addressed. Decades later, 
Denmark  has  claimed  that  geological  evidence  points  to  Hans  Island  being  part  of 
Greenland, and therefore that it belongs to Denmark by extension of the Court's ruling. 
However,  during  negotiations  between  Canada  and  Denmark  on  Northern  maritime 
boundaries in 1973, Canada claimed that Hans Island was part of its territory. Full borders 
were drawn between Canada and Greenland in 1973, except for a stretch of 875 metres – 
Hans Island lies bang in the middle of this stretch. After some symbolic landings and ‘tit 
for tat’ flag raising and flag bashing, the three governments (Greenland included) have 
agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In a flash 
of semi serious imagination, a contributor to a Canadian newspaper has suggested turning 
Hans Island into a military prison, which, among other things: “would stake our claim to 
the island, keeping the pesky Danes out for good” (Riehm, 2006).  
Indivisible Islandness 
Perhaps one would be inclined to suggest a simple Solomon’s solution to such concerns: 
divide the island(s) involved equally between the contenders. This may appear not to be 
too  difficult,  especially  for  a  place  like  Hans  Island;  even  though  UNCLOS  and  the 
potential for EEZ complicate the issue. Indeed, one suggestion for a negotiated settlement 
briefly considered in the aftermath of the Argentine take over of the Falklands/Malvinas in 
1982 was to treat the 200 island archipelago (about which more to follow below) in a 
somewhat similar fashion as liable to partition, assigning West Falkland to Argentina and 
East Falkland to Britain (Freedman, 2007: 188).  
However, carving up an island is an abhorred proposition. Unlike mainlands, all of which 
are carved up into various political units, islands seem to suggest a natural indivisibility. 
The finite island geography of an island smoothens the nurturing of a sense of identity that 
is contiguous with territory – and can make some conflicts even more difficult to resolve                                                                                                          Islands in Between 
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(Anckar, 2005; Baldacchino, 2005; Srebrnik, 2004). There are just over 85,000 islands in 
the world with a surface area greater than 0.1km
2 (Depraetere & Dahl, 2007: table 2). Yet 
remarkably, out of these (and excluding those that are either depopulated or otherwise 
under contestation), only eleven are shared (de facto or de jure) between more than one 
jurisdiction, and in some of these cases, not without resistance by those who would see 
them eventually under unitary control: Borneo (divided between Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Sultanate of Brunei) and Cyprus (divided between the sovereign state of Cyprus, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the UK Sovereign Military Bases, but excluding 
the UN buffer zone) are currently the only islands in the world to be divided between three 
countries). Then, there is Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Ireland (United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland), New Guinea (Indonesian West Papua and Papua 
New Guinea), Sebatik (Indonesia and Malaysia), Saint Martin/Sint Maarten (France and 
the Netherlands), Tierra del Fuego (Argentina and Chile), Timor (Indonesia and Timor 
Leste), Usenam/Usedom (Germany and Poland); and, as of 2008, the island of Bolshoi 
Ussuriysky on the Sino Russian border   all divided between two countries. De facto, one 
may add Sri Lanka, with its east and north effectively under separatist control (Royle, 
2001: 150 1; The Economist, 2008). 
An Island in Between: Martín García 
 
The situation of the River Plate – with such islands as Juncal, Flores, Gorriti and Lobos –is 
a clear reflection of the evolving turbulent politics of the region. This section focuses on 
the history of the island of Martín García (co ordinates 34°11′S, 58°15′W). The island 
(0.7 square miles, 168 hectares, 500 acres or 2 km
2) which is today part of Buenos Aires 
province, Argentina, rises 27 metres above sea level and has a population of 200. It is 
situated near the confluence of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, a mere 1 km (0.62 miles) 
inside Uruguayan waters, about 3.5 km (2.1 miles) from the Uruguayan coastline, near the 
small city of Martín Chico, but 33.5 km from Tigre, on the Argentine coast (see Figure 1). 
 
In  the  early  19th  century,  independence  movements  sprung  up  across  South  America, 
including Uruguay (then known as the Banda Oriental, or ‘Eastern Strip’, referring to the 
area  east  of  the  Uruguay  river).  Spanish Portuguese  rivalry  was  tense,  and  Uruguayan 
territory was contested between the nascent states of Brazil and the Republic of the River 
Plate (Argentina). Brazil annexed the area in 1821 under the name of Provincia Cisplatina, 
but a revolt began in 1825, after which Uruguay became an independent state with the 
Treaty of Montevideo in 1828, this new country acting very much as a buffer territory 
between Spanish Argentina and Portuguese Brazil. 
 
 G. Baldacchino 
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Figure  1:  The  River  Plate  Region/  Río  de  la  Plata,  South  America,  showing  the 
international boundary between Argentina and Uruguay (dotted line). 
 
Source: http://www.lapshin.org/cultivar/N19/PIC/Rio de la Plata.jpg.  
 
Isla Martín García is also known as the Gibraltar of the River Plate (an observation to 
which we shall return later). It has historically been a strategic control point in the estuary 
of Río de la Plata, near the mouth of the Uruguay and Paraná rivers, between Argentina 
and  Uruguay.  In  March  1814,  it  was  taken  from  the  Spaniards  by  the  forces  of  the 
Argentine admiral William (Guillermo) Brown.  
 
Given the navigability of the Río de la Plata, the strategic significance of the small island 
was so important that anyone who controlled it would practically dominate all maritime 
activity in the delta, thus challenging trade in the region which, in the 19
th century, was still 
mainly carried out by sea. For this reason, a treaty for the Free Navigation of the Rivers 
Paraná and Uruguay was concluded between the USA and Argentina in July 1853. Article 
5 states that: the high contracting parties, considering that the Island of Martin Garcia may, 
from its position, embarrass and impede the free navigation of the confluents of the river 
Plate, agree to use their influence to prevent the possession of the said island from being 
retained or held by any State of the river Plate, or its confluents, which shall not have given 
its adhesion to the principle of their free navigation. (Treaty of 1853: Article 5). Three 
years  earlier,  Domingo  Faustino  Sarmiento  had  written  Argirópolis,  a  treatise  arguing 
passionately for a consolidated, strong Latin American state that would straddle both sides 
of the Río de la Plata. The new state’s capital would be located appropriately on Martín 
García (Sarmiento, 1850).  
                                                                                                          Islands in Between 
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Prisoners from the Indian Wars of 1879 were interned on the rocky island, which was also 
a place of exile for various presidents of Argentina, including Marcelo T. de Alvear (in 
1932) Hipólito Irigoyen (twice in the 1930s), Juan Perón (1945, before his election), and 
Arturo Frondizi (1962 63). In the early months of World War II, Argentine authorities 
briefly incarcerated crew members  from the German battleship Graf Spee, scuttled off 
Montevideo in December 1939. The island was also used as a detention and torture site 
during  the  1976–1983  military  dictatorship.  An  agreement  reached  by  Argentina  and 
Uruguay in November 1973   known as the River Plate Treaty   signed by Juan Domingo 
Perón and Juan Maria Bordaberry   on the management of the estuary and the river border 
of the two countries affirmed Argentine jurisdiction over  Isla Martín García (which is 
actually on the Uruguayan side of the boundary), ending a century old dispute between the 
two countries over the island. According to the terms of the agreement, Martín García was 
to be devoted exclusively to a natural reserve. Thus, this small island, has been a military 
outpost, a penal colony and is now a National Historical Monument and Flora and Fauna 
Reserve, as well as a popular holiday site for a day outing or a weekend getaway in the 
delta of the Río de la Plata. Border tension between Argentina and Uruguay has flared 
again, but not because of this island: in May 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings before 
the International Court of Justice against Uruguay claiming that Uruguay has breached a 
bilateral treaty obligation to consult with Argentina before taking action on a pulp mill 
project affecting the River Uruguay, which partially constitutes the joint boundary of the 
two South American countries. If completed, this would be the world’s biggest cellulose 
mill project (Bekker, 2006).  
 
Islands in Between 
 
Kinmen 
 
Reference has already been made to the case of Taiwan, the focus of a nervous military 
build up  in  Eastern  Asia,  involving  Taiwan  itself  and  mainland  China,  with  the  USA, 
Japan and Russia having  an interest in the balance.  Taiwan is itself an archipelago of 
various islands (like the Matsu and Penghu group); one of which is the Kinmen group. 
Some  of  these  islands  are  located  less  than  1  km  from  the  mainland  of  the  People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and more than 200 km from ‘mainland’ Taiwan. Kinmen was 
heavily bombed by the PRC in 1958 and an invasion has been feared since. In the tense 
current atmosphere between ‘the two Chinas’, Kinmen has served as an unofficial meeting 
point,  a  ‘no  man’s  land’,  where  either  party  feels  comfortable  to  meet  discreetly  and 
discuss issues of common concern (Hung Ta, 2004). Perhaps Martín García performs the 
same  function,  should  that  ever  be  necessary,  since  it  is  a  likely  meeting  place  for 
Argentines and Uruguayans. 
 
Gibraltar 
 
Perhaps the case of Martín García provides some more insights, since the resolution of the 
dispute to the mutual satisfaction of both sides in 1973 suggests that solutions to island G. Baldacchino 
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contests  by  mainland  claims  are  possible;  moreover,  in  this  particular  case,  the 
transformation of the island into a pleasure zone was a key concession by Argentina
3. 
 
That Martín García is known as the Gibraltar of the River Plate is a reminder of the real 
Gibraltar, a rock of just 6.5km
2, with a population of 28,000, located at the tip of Southern 
Spain. It is one of only two of the United Kingdom’s Overseas Territories which is not a 
geographical island
4, but it is very much an island in any other sense
5. 
It has already been argued that international relations abhor divided islands. Hans Island, 
Kinmen Island and Martín García Island have not been divided, and are not likely to be so 
in the future. Yet, there are a variety of ways in which islands can be divided. Britain and 
Spain had been discussing innovative solutions leading to some form of joint or shared 
sovereignty over Gibraltar, starting in the late 1990s. Unhappy with these developments, 
the  Government  of  Gibraltar  took  its  own  initiative  and  organized  a  referendum  on 
November 7, 2002, where the people of Gibraltar were asked the following question: 
 "On July 12, 2002, the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, in a formal statement in the 
House  of  Commons,  said  that,  after  12  months  of  negotiation,  the  British 
Government  and  Spain  are  in  broad  agreement  on  many  of  the  principles  that 
should underpin a lasting settlement of Spain's sovereignty claim, which included 
the principle that Britain and Spain should share sovereignty over Gibraltar. 
Do you approve of the principle that Britain and Spain should share sovereignty 
over Gibraltar?" 
With a turnout of 87.9%, 98.5% of the electorate voted NO (Gibraltar web site, 2006). 
Since then, the Government of Gibraltar has been involved in talks involving the United 
Kingdom and Spain that purport to discuss the future of that territory. 
Falklands / Las Malvinas 
 
The  Gibraltar  situation  reminds  us  of  another  UK  Overseas  Territory  whose  status  is 
disputed by a Spanish speaking nation. In the case of the Falkland Islands (in English) or 
Las Islas Malvinas (in Spanish), the United Kingdom and Argentina are the respective 
claimants. In spite of their many differences, Gibraltar and Falklands/Malvinas make the 
subject of an interesting comparison. Both are sub national island jurisdictions with a fair 
degree  of  autonomy;  both  have  been/remain  overseas  territories  of  the  U.K.  for  many 
years; both have been taken over by the UK in a debatable manner; both are the subject of 
persistent protests by their contiguous mainland power, with both submitting claims based 
on territorial integrity; and both having the local residents speaking English and staunchly 
                                                 
3 In much the same way, the transfer of sovereignty of the Åland Islands to Finland via a league of Nations 
Resolution in 1920 was accepted by Sweden also because the islands were to be demilitarized (Rotkirch, 
1986). 
4 The other being the British Antarctic Territory. 
5 Indeed, with Gibraltar’s border with Spain shut between 1969 and 1985, Gibraltar become even closer to an 
ideotypical “island” (e.g. Burke & Sawchuk, 2007).                                                                                                           Islands in Between 
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pro British in their loyalties. The two case studies are also significant because much of the 
sovereignty arguments do not hinge only on the lands in question but also on the use of the 
territorial seas surrounding the actual physical territories (Fawcett, 1967; Bossano, 1994; 
Dodds,  2002).  Ironically,  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  (1713)  which  granted  Gibraltar  ‘in 
perpetuity’  to  Britain,  also  confirmed  Spain's  control  of  South  American  territories, 
including the Falklands/Malvinas. Argentina explicitly mentions ‘Las Malvinas’ as part of 
its territory in its 1994 constitution, along with the South Georgia and South Sandwich 
Islands. 
  
Of  course,  one  aspect  which  contrasts  Gibraltar  with  the  Falklands/Malvinas  is  the 
different comfort levels that Britain, and its government, have felt about such imperial 
remnants.  The  UK  had  been  extremely  sensitive  and  jealous  of  its  Southern  European 
fortress:  Gibraltar  was  only  2  hours  flying  time  from  London  and  there  was  talk  of 
integration with the UK in the 1960s
6; whereas the Falklands was a remote island colony 
that wanted to remain British but was a low strategic priority during the Cold War. Britain 
was actually reducing its military scientific presence in the South Atlantic region when 
Argentina  launched  its  ‘recovery  campaign’  in  1982.  The  British  Government’s 
indifference  changed  when  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  decided  to  launch  a 
powerfully iconic and nationalist campaign to “liberate the Falklands”, appealing to the 
Falklanders’ staunch Britishness and island character (Dodds, 2002). Britain consolidated 
its military infrastructure on the islands after the campaign, with a new base at Mount 
Pleasant Airport (fully operational by 1986). A new constitution came into force in 1985, 
giving the islands greater autonomy. The discovery of huge spawning grounds for two 
types of squid   Illex  and Loligo (the latter better known as calamares) – in Falkland 
waters opened up opportunities for economic diversification. In 2001, the Falklands' and 
Argentine governments issued a joint statement to close their Illex fishing season early, 
thus giving the stock a chance to recover from over fishing. Tourism has also grown to 
some 3,000 a year, while some 40,000 cruise ship passengers sail through Stanley annually 
on their way to Antarctica (The Economist, 2002; Royle, 2006). The possibility of tapping 
oil and gas deposits in the surrounding waters led to Falkland Oil & Gas Limited (FOGL) 
being formed in May 2004 to invest in an offshore oil exploration programme, covering 
approximately 33,700 km
2 south and east of the Islands (FOGL, 2006). While all these 
initiatives  suggest  a  growing  economic  prosperity  to  the  islanders,  the  Argentine 
government  considers  the  decision  to  issue  such  licenses  for  hydrocarbon  exploration, 
apart from other licenses for fishing, to be illegitimate and an extension of colonialism. 
This in spite of an agreement between Argentina and the UK in 1995 which was meant to 
defuse licensing and sovereignty conflicts (under the so called sovereignty umbrella) that 
would dampen foreign interest in exploiting potential oil reserves. Also in 1995, Argentina 
agreed to no longer seek settlement of the matter by force. In June 2003, the ‘Falklands 
dispute’ was brought before a United Nations committee, but the UK has since refused to 
resume these negotiations on the islands´ sovereignty – on the basis that it has agreed to 
respect the ‘wishes’ of the Falkland Islanders for as long as that community wants (La 
Prensa Latina, 2006).  
 
                                                 
6. In February 1967, the Integration with Britain Party, hitherto a “pressure group”, formed itself into a 
political party under the leadership of Bob Peliza. G. Baldacchino 
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Until Argentina agrees to consider possible innovative governance options other than the 
simple reversion of the Falklands/Malvinas to its sovereignty, Whitehall is not likely to 
open any negotiations with Buenos Aires (e.g. COHA, 2007).   
 
Shared Sovereignty? 
 
Interestingly,  there  has  been  a  strong  case  made  recently  for  ‘shared  sovereignty’  in 
principle: situations in which authority would be shared by external and internal actors 
(Krasner, 2005). The actual experience ‘on the ground’ has not been very common, and 
remains contentious: Bosnia and Kosovo are the best, recent examples. The model has 
been proposed as a solution to ‘the Cyprus Question’ and to the ‘Jerusalem Question’. One 
location where a condominium appears to have worked well, and for 74 years (1906 – 
1980), has been in a Pacific island archipelago: the Anglo French Condominium of New 
Hebrides / Nouvelles Hébrides, now the Republic of Vanuatu.  
 
Meanwhile, the ‘sovereign’ states of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the 
Marshall Islands have, since their ‘independence’, assigned their defence and security (and 
thus perhaps in practice also their foreign policy) to the USA in the context of a Compact 
of Free Association (CFA) whose fiscal generosity basically under writes their economic 
(and  possibly  even  political)  viability  (e.g.  Underwood,  2003):  they  might  not  have 
entertained  independence  without  that  financial  lifeline.  Even  with  those  generous 
financial guarantees, the Northern Mariana Islands decided to break away from FSM and 
struck a separate deal with the USA, with the latter’s full encouragement. The islanders 
secured for themselves Commonwealth status with the USA (1985) and US citizenship 
(1986) (Anckar, 2003: 118). Same as with Guam, Puerto Rico and American Samoa, the 
US controls their foreign policy, in exchange for pledging to defend these territories from 
any “foreign aggression” (Fowler & Bunck, 1995: 117). 
 
‘Shared sovereignty’ is not immune from its own spate of difficulties, however. Even after 
three  referenda,  Puerto  Rico  continues  to  grapple  with  what  status  it  wants  for  itself 
(Ramos & Rivera, 2001). The CFA between the USA and Palau was only approved after 
eight referenda (World Guide, 2008). The Svalbard archipelago, although part of the state 
of Norway, is the subject of the Paris Treaty of 1920 that allows its signatories, apart from 
Norway, the right to establish settlements on its soil; such a right has been exercised by 
Russia. The latter has however also recently claimed that such rights extend to seabed oil 
and gas exploration within Svalbard’s EEZ. The Norwegian Foreign Minister has argued 
that other Paris Treaty signatory countries (like Russia) are not entitled to engage in oil and 
gas related activities in Svalbard waters without Norwegian consent, simply because the 
area is part of the Norwegian continental shelf (BarentsObserver.com, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In spite of international borders attempting to be precise, they can at times prove fuzzy and 
somewhat  ambiguous  spaces.  No  wonder  they  are  liable  to  dispute.  The  CIA  World 
Factbook  states  that  the  convergence  of  the  Argentina Brazil Paraguay  borders  is  an 
“unruly  region”,  a  “locus  of  money  laundering,  smuggling,  arms  and  illegal  narcotics                                                                                                          Islands in Between 
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trafficking,  and  fundraising  for  extremist  organizations”.  Moreover,  a  dispute  between 
Brazil and Uruguay over Braziliera Island in the Quarai/ Cuareim River leaves the precise 
tri point with Argentina in doubt (CIA, 2006). We should not be surprised: borders, in 
spite of conventional wisdom and official intent, are often porous, permeable features: they 
are liminal spaces with osmotic properties, important tools in a contemporary game of 
economic prosperity, military strategy or national security. Even here, islands ‘in between’ 
can play a key role. 
 
Rather than an unfortunate geographic status of insularity and marginalization, insular in 
betweenity can harbour opportunities. Former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Eric 
Williams (1964: 122) had also commented on the island of Tobago as being in a state of 
“betweenity”, transferred from country to country, changing national flags and political 
allegiance with consummate ease. Dale (2004: 13) defines ‘in betweenity’ as the condition 
of operating in a cultural grey zone, ‘between’ cultures. 
 
While  islands  clearly  remain  nervous  flashpoints  in  global  geopolitics,  some  have 
benefitted  from  well crafted  governance  arrangements  that  have  facilitated  bilateral 
cooperation  and  prevented  hostilities  between  claimant  states.  The  large  number  of 
sovereign island states and of sub national island jurisdictions (e.g. Baldacchino & Milne, 
2008), for example, offers a handy population of historical or contemporary exemplars of 
de jure and de facto federacy arrangements – some clearly works in progress – that may 
have  been  designed  not  just  to  satisfy  local  islander  interests  and  aspirations  for  self 
determination, but also to allay the fears and concerns of wary contiguous powers.  
 
References 
 
Anckar, D. (2005) ‘Decentralization in Microstates: Where, How and Why?’, Canadian 
Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. 31, Nos. 1 2, pp. 109 120. 
 
Anckar,  D.  (2003)  ‘Lilliput  Federalism:  Profiles  and  Varieties’,  Regional  and  Federal 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 107 124. 
 
Anderson, E.W. (2000) Global Geopolitical Flashpoints: An Atlas of Conflict, Chicago IL, 
Fitzroy Dearborn. 
 
Baldacchino, G. (2008)  ‘Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State 
Diplomacy’  in  T.  Shaw  &  A.F.  Cooper  (eds.)  Diplomacies  of  Small  States:  Between 
Vulnerability and Resilience, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. 
 
Baldacchino,  G.  (2004)  ‘Autonomous  but  not  Sovereign?  A  Review  of  Island 
Sub nationalism’, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. 31, Nos. 1 2, pp. 77 
89. G. Baldacchino 
  222
Baldacchino, G. & Milne, D. (eds.) (2008) The Case for Non-Sovereignty: Lessons from 
Sub-National Island Jurisdictions, London, Routledge. 
BarentsObserver.com (2008) ‘Norway challenged by Russian plans in Spitsbergen waters’, 
August  5,  http://www.barentsobserver.com/norway challenged by russian plans in 
spitsbergen waters.4500045 28235.html. 
 
BBC  (2004)  ‘Indonesia  Flashpoints:  The  Moluccas’,  BBC  News,  June  28, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia pacific/3812599.stm.  
 
Bekker,  P.H.F.  (2006)  ‘Argentina Uruguay  Environmental  Border  Dispute  before  the 
World Court’, ASIL Insight, (American Society of International Law), Vol. 10, No. 11, 
May 16, www.asil.org/insights/2006/05/insights060516.html.  
 
Bong,  Y.D.  (2002)  Flashpoints  at  Sea?  Legitimization  Strategy  and  East  Asian  Island 
Disputes: Japan, China, Russia, Korea, unpublished dissertation, Penn Library, University 
of Pennsylvania. 
  
Bossano, J. (1994) ‘The Fight for Self Determination: Joe Bossano at the United Nations’, 
Gibraltar,  Reference  Documents  about  Gibraltar  and  its  Political  Struggles, 
www.gibnet.com/texts/jbun1.htm. 
 
Burke, S.D.A. & Sawchuk, L.A. (2007) ‘Reproductive Choices in Gibraltar: A Case Study 
of a Community in Transition, 1960 1996’, Canadian Studies in Population, Vol. 34, No. 
2, pp. 149 178. 
 
CIA  (2006)  World  Fact  Book,  Washington  DC,  Central  Intelligence  Agency, 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ar.html#Issues. 
 
COHA  (2007)  ‘Argentina  and  the  Falklands/Malvinas:  Could  the  Conflict  with  Great 
Britain  have  been  Averted?,  Washington  DC,  Council  on  Hemispheric  Affairs, 
http://www.coha.org/2007/08/argentina and the falklandsmalvinas could the conflict 
with great britain have been averted/.  
 
Dale,  B.  (2004)  ‘Anthropology  as  a  Comparative  Project:  Some  Recent  Challenges’, 
Norway,  Faculty  of  Social  Science,  University  of  Tromsø,  16pp., 
http://homepage.mac.com/brigtdale/.Public/proveforelesning.pdf. 
 
Depraetere,  C.  &  Dahl,  A.L.  (2007)  ‘Island  Locations  and  Classifications’  in  G. 
Baldacchino (ed.) A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader, Charlottetown, Canada 
and  Luqa,  Malta,  Institute  of  Island  Studies,  University  of  Prince  Edward  Island  and 
Agenda Academic, pp. 57 106. 
 
Dodds, K. (2002) Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire, London, IB Tauris. 
                                                                                                          Islands in Between 
  223
Fawcett, J.E.S. (1967) ‘Gibraltar: The Legal Issues’, International Affairs, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 236 251. 
Freedman,  L.  (2007)  The  Official  History  of  the  Falklands  Campaign:  War  and 
Diplomacy, London, Routledge. 
  
FOGL (2006) Falkland Oil & Gas, www.fogl.com/fog/corporate.php?sec=0&sub=1.  
 
Fowler, M.R. and Bunck, J.M. (1995) Law, Power and the Sovereign State: the Evolution 
and Application of the  Concept of Sovereignty, University Park PA, The Pennsylvania 
State University Press. 
 
Gibraltar  web site  (2002)  The  2002  Referendum:  November  7,  2002, 
www.gibnet.com/texts/ref2.htm. 
  
Hung Ta, C. (2004) ‘Cultural Landscape in the Island with the Status of the Borderland: 
The  Case  of  Kinmen’,  paper  presented  at  the  8
th  ‘Islands  of  the  World’  Conference, 
Kinmen Island, November. 
 
Jersey Links (2006) ‘Some useful links about Jersey  the British Channel Island where I 
live’, www.localdial.com/users/localhero/jersey_channel_islands.htm. 
  
Krasner, S.D. (2005) ‘The Case for Shared Sovereignty", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, pp. 69 83.  
 
La Prensa Latina (2006) ‘British Measures on Malvinas Illegitimate’, Buenos Aires, June 27. 
 
Lindström, B. (2000) ‘Culture and Economic Development in Åland’ in G. Baldacchino & 
D. Milne (eds.) Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness 
of Jurisdiction, Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp. 107 120. 
 
Mack, A. (1997) ‘Troubled Waters: Island Flashpoints in Northeast Asia’, Asia Pacific 
Magazine, No. 8, December. 
 
Muir, R. (1975) Modern Political Geography, London, Macmillan. 
 
Norton Moore, J. & Nordquist, M.H. (eds.) (1998) Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea 
Access and Military Confrontation, New York, Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Nunn, P.D. (1994) Oceanic Islands, Oxford, Blackwell. 
 
Quammen,  D.  (1996)  The  Song  of  the  Dodo:  Island  Biogeography  in  an  Age  of 
Extinctions, London, Hutchinson. 
 
Ramos, A. G. & Rivera, A.I. (eds.) (2001) Islands at the Crossroads: Politics in the Non-
Independent Caribbean, Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers. G. Baldacchino 
  224
  
Riehm, M. (2006) ‘Fantasy Island’, Letter to the Editor, The Globe and Mail, June 3, A14. 
Rotkirch,  H.  (1986)  ‘The  Demilitarization  and  Neutralization  of  the  Åland  Islands:  A 
Regime ‘in European Interests’ Withstanding Changing Circumstances’, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 357 376. 
 
Royle, S.A. (2001) A Geography of Islands: Small Island Insularity, London, Routledge. 
 
Royle,  S.A.  (2006)  ‘The  Falkland  Islands’  in  G.  Baldacchino  (ed.)  Extreme  Tourism: 
Lessons from the World’s Cold Water Islands, Oxford, Elsevier, pp. 180 191. 
 
Sarmiento,  F.D.  (1850/2000)  Argirópolis,  edited  by  www.elaleph.com, 
www.unsl.edu.ar/librosgratis/gratis/argiropolis.pdf.  
 
Srebrnik, H.F. (2004) ‘Small Island Nations and Democratic Values’, World Development, 
Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 329 342. 
The Economist (2002) ‘Virtue Rewarded: Conservation in the Falkland Islands’, London, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 17. 
The  Economist  (2008)  ‘The  Cockerel’s  Cropped  Crest’.  London:  The  Economist 
Intelligence Unit, July 26, pp. 49 50. 
 
Treaty for the Free Navigation of the Rivers Paraná and Uruguay, concluded between the 
USA  and  Argentina,  July  10,  1853, 
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/argentina/argen01.htm. 
 
UN (1958) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April, New York, 
United  Nations, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf  
 
Underwood,  R.A.  (2003)  ‘The  Amended  U.S.  Compacts  of  Free  Association  with  the 
Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands: Less Free, More 
Compact’, Working Paper No. 16, Hawaii, East West Center, Pacific Islands Development 
Series, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/compacts/PIDP_WP16.pdf.  
 
Williams,  E.  (1964)  History  of  the  People  of  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  London,  Andre 
Deutsch. 
World  Guide  (2008)  Palau:  History, 
http://sbs.com.au/theworldnews/Worldguide/index.php3?country=154&header=4. 
Zakharchenko, I. (2008) ‘The Russian Japanese Territorial Dispute: Four Islands Divided 
by  Two?’,  RIA  Novosti,  Russian  News  and  Information  Agency,  November  7, 
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081107/118183288.html. 